A Historic Legal Battle -- A Case Like None-Other

"...CBS officials by their own admission launched this matter's precipatory investigation utilizing the defendants represented by their counsel, including a former police detective, and others, seeking criminal elements to charge me with. For this $56 billion dollar public company receiving money from U.S. Financial Markets and it's gigantic legal department the world over to claim it lacks the legal resources and needs additional time to answer the 25-page transparent counterclaim of an individual pro se borders on a judicial admission of guilt, and is derelict to their public duty."     -Benjamin Irish U.S. 1:15-cv-05348 2d

CBS TV wants to file a motion claiming their producer Joseph Frye was not beholden to their Conduct agreement protecting hundreds of thousands of shareholders, when in fact they signed off on it, and continued to employ him. "Frye later informed Showtime of his short film, as required by his employment agreement. He also registered copyrights on his script and film... Upon leaving Showtime, Frye found work at FOX News; a company completely unaffiliated with CBS Corporation or Showtime Networks, Inc." --Judicial Admission of Attorney Danny Jiminian, representing Joseph Frye ECF #1:15-cv-05348 NRB




10/26/2016 -- ECF 1:15-cv-05348 US 2d


1. Cases that involve stalking horse elements are growing more complex, and encompass now and expand on ever more direct Constitutional erosions. The ability to block the process for which law is decided ultimately removes consequence from criminal acts, making the public a target without any legal recourse.


2. Fortunately there is a solution within our system, that solution lying in reason. Pre-emptive legal strikes have historically been attached to due process violations and expand to other Rights erosions precious to our Justice System, including those against Speech, The Press, Legal Standing and Rights of Evidence.


3. Substantive law authorizes this Court to review individually on the merits these pre-emptive acts, and strike down statutes which present a collateral consequence to the Nation. Surely Due Process experiments meet this standard of question: "The Court has the power to prevent an experiment." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman (285 US 262 [1929]) Justice Luis Brandeis continued in dissent noting Frost v. Corporation Commission (298 US 515 [1929]): "We may strike down the statute that embodies it on the ground that in our opinion the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have the power to do this because the Due Process clause had been held by the Court applicable to matters of law as well as matters of procedure."


4. The bell of solid evidence cannot be unrung. The claims against the counter-defendants for which their lawyers have attempted to seek dismissal and/or summary judgment motions against, being standards of reason that are heavily weighted with an abundance of evidence that clearly shows a reasonable due process blockage. The interests of expedient Justice further compel the counter defendants to address the evidence presented against them with proof just as weighted to defeat this logic as unreasonable.


5. Pro se litigants are just as important a part of the law's construction as it's other framers. The People's framework equally entrenches pro se litigants in Due Process, the common sense being that despite an unnatural understanding of legal construction, they contribute to it by representing key portions of its interests.


6. A description of acts and events is presented in ECF # 106 (Am. Answers, Defenses and Counterclaims) which detail violations of civil statutes backed by proof that they are also criminal acts, separately or combined, but also stand as enforceable under civil penalties just the same.


7. Courts take reasonable special measure with Pro Ses to insure they remain within equal boundaries of the law while insuring their contentions meet standards of substance. The answers, defenses and counterclaims meet those substantive standards in this matter to an extent which provides a clear authorization for the Court to determine Sua Sponte that the pro se counterclaim withholds the tests of merit to survive either a 12 (b)(6) or summary judgment motion against it.


8. Commerce and the public interest have played an intricate part in this matter, counter defendants being a key part of a public company benefiting from U.S. Financial Markets, and the lurking use of Government to suppress newsworthy discussion and Freedom of Speech with the public as relates to such, that being the stalking horse use claims I make to this Court. Such is the pre-emptive experiment that Justice Brandeis continues in New State Ice to describe as having "...serious consequences to the Nation..." if not denied, and without denial, allowed only if "without risk to the rest of the Country."


9. Denial of such legal experiments, in this case being the attempt to diminish the Rights I share as equal to protect me by calling for dismissal based on my harmless inability to express correctly a statute, surely guards against the risk Justice Brandeis described.


10. Justice Brandeis dissented there in a matter uniquely similar to this one, relying on case law that struck the experiment of a license as-requirement for acts of commerce that are "sufficient to meet the public needs." The Justice probably did not realize how vital an element of construction this would prove to be in the modern application, and further to the future as we travel down the "wild-wild-west of information flow" highway our current President Barack Obama has sought guidance from the Judiciary to find a "curating function that people agree to" which is rooted in truth, and benefits the public as newsworthy content.


11. This motion now brings that question to the door of reasonable answer. The Supreme Court distinguished Frost from New Ice as concerned with protections of commerce and business describing "grinding grain" as being sufficient to meet those public needs. In the matter aforementioned, it was described that, at the time, luxury market products such as ice did not compare to this public need. "The mills of Justice grind slowly but exceedingly fine." (Scholarly Dicta, William Murray, Somersett's Case, 1772.)


12. The First Amendment and the protections it provides for the unabridged discussion of matters protecting the public surely passes the test of what is "sufficient to meet the public needs" to conclude that a license is not necessary for public discussion, such as is proven in Frost, and cries for curation of law today to protect against censorship tomorrow. Here lies that opportunity:


13. This matter centers around a dispute which entered this Court tactically as a pre-emptive measure to block precisely that discussion of matters to the public which can easily be determined as to their detriment, through a copyright infringement and breach of contract claim. (CBS TV is a public company, representing hundreds of thousands of investors including pensioners, people with 401ks, and retirees through their securities against the investment products of their TV shows, such as that disputed here, which is alleged as fraud.) The statutes the Plaintiff seeks relief in his pleading for center around a theory that a license he issued to the defendant is not valid for defendant's use of footage from a project that defendant has made sufficient presentation was both part of a deceptive economic fraud to gain advantage by a major public company, and that the defendant requires a license to make a public discussion in this matter, which is the failed sufficient means theory of Frost.


14. Frost lays precedent for licensing requirements no different than a copyright license, as rooted in commerce activities of comparable businesses in the same market. It finds the sufficient public need as of commercial grain alteration necessary to the public benefit and therefore not requiring of a license, but this "public interest to the population" incomparable with businesses serving luxury markets. (As described in Scholarly Dicta, United States Supreme Court Cases Vol. 285)


15. Here the defendant did not even engage in the sale of the disputed footage, and therefore did not engage in a business activity. However, the plaintiff issued him the license to display the disputed footage as an "example of [his] work", which is only reasonable to infer as being for the purpose of commerce exactly in the same fashion, but defendant did not even use this application, opting only to display the footage in a limited showing which he did not charge for. In fact, the license the Plaintiff issued him, unnecessary in this context anyway for a wide variety of reasons, was issued to the defendant so he could profit from that use, by obtaining work based on his abilities displayed thereby.


16. Defendant presented footage as part of a discussion with the public that absolutely met the public interest of protecting the People against criminal activity, a substantive legal Right in the protection of due process.


17. This is the curative standard our Commander-in-Chief has asked for our contribution to, and verifies the use of footage by defendant as rooted in truth, because it's use is weighted with proof against claims that fall short of any reasonable evidence standard in comparison, and are simply "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" as defined by Justice Brandeis who wrote in New State "...we must ever be on guard lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."


18. Denying the discussion of and the contention to dispositive motions in the face of such strong evidence would be "fraught with serious consequences for the Nation" as Brandeis described. The original complaint here, the elements of such being fraught themselves by defect, contradiction and change, presents a true question of substantive legal process, and any motion challenging its legal standing as such should be denied and the matter expedited to trial without delay. The on-going hearing of baseless motions in this matter, such as dismissal based on lack of the contentions having merit, are further redundant pre-emptive legal tactics.


19. "Decisions tailored to the prevailing political winds..." (as described by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, Scholarly Dicta, Making Democracy Work, The Basic Approach 2010) describes an approach to this reasonable conclusion as being an application of "values to circumstances", the value of precedents to modern times against the idea of a short-term popular fix. Here the popular decision would be not to consider my request for relief a detrimental to those who rely on CBS-issued financial products, but as beneficial to them instead, a protection against further loss and chaos should the company not be ordered to take this very important look inside themselves and decide if it is willing to atone for these crimes in a way that returns the benefits it promised it's hundreds of thousands of shareholders and others associated by this business model. The model itself is an insult to our Nation's spirit.


20. It must be noted further that the stalking horse acts of the combined parties here against two jurisdictions have raised a conundrum of legal inquiry in the State Jurisdiction as well, with Judges, lawyers, and even adversarial prosecutors raising the issues of Due Process violations by the collective acts of the counter defendants here, even naming them outright, on multiple occasions in open-court. This is a unique finding of fact but is mooted and serves the purpose of the parties prevailing on both jurisdictions by the continued delay of a trial here. There is sufficient continual harm being imposed upon me by these parties as relates to the original complaint here, and such cries for redress in some form, this Court being trusted in that by myself, in the Interests of Justice. Please do not let these people disallow responsibility here.


21. I ask that the court deny any motion of the counter defendants seeking dismissal on the theory that this case has no standing in substantive law, and that the Court order this case a matter for trial. No appeal would be proper without this Court's complete finding of evidentiary fact.


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